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production management. We first discuss the economic interpretation of the Quasi-Variational Inequality 
problem. We then apply the algorithmic approach to a set of stylized case studies in order to illustrate the 
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The restructuring of the European electricity market is a long process. The integration of vari-
ous national markets through the so called \Market Coupling" approach is currently the most
advanced market design in Europe. In contrast with the standard US approach to restructur-
ing that aims at transforming the numerous constraints appearing in the electricity system in
specially designed markets, market coupling essentially relies on an energy market and leaves
it to the Transmission System Operators (TSOs1) to take care of most of these constrains by
a mix of market and quantitative constructs. The result is what economists call an incomplete
market where several constraints are not priced by the market. We take up a particular question
of market coupling namely the removal of congestion through counter-trading. This problem
has been encountered in many jurisdictions outside of Central Western Europe and hence is of
general interest. We then look at the problem of the organization of counter-trading by dierent
system operators through the glasses of Generalized Nash Equilibrium (GNE), which provides
a natural context for modeling incomplete markets. Generalized Nash Equilibria are related
to Quasi-Variational Inequality (QV I) models for which computational advances have recently
been proposed. QV I problems are extensions of Variational Inequality (V I) problems. They
dier by both their mathematical properties and economic interpretations. This paper implic-
itly uses the V I and QV I concepts by respectively referring to the Nash Equilibrium (NE) and
Generalized Nash Equilibrium (GNE) problems.
A Nash Equilibrium describes an equilibrium between agents interacting through their pay-
os: the action of one agent inuences the payo of another agent. A Generalized Nash Equi-
librium involves agents that interact both at the level of their payos, but also through their
strategy sets: the action of an agent can inuence the payo of another agent, but it can also
change the set of actions that this agent can undertake. The idea of using Generalized Nash
Equilibrium in electricity transmission controlled by several operators is quite natural: because
of Kirchho's laws, the actions of one operator inuences the set of possible actions of another
operator. A transmission system operated by dierent operators is thus naturally described by
a Generalized Nash Equilibrium.
The concept of GNE was rst introduced by Arrow and Debreu in [1] and Debreu in [3] where
they refer to these problems as an abstract economy. Apart from these pioneering contributions,
only in the nineties were GNEs recognized for their numerous applications in economics, math-
ematics and engineering. In the context of electricity applications, Wei and Smeers [13], solve a
GNE problem for an oligopolistic electricity market where generators behave  a la Cournot and
transmission prices are regulated. Pang and Fukushima [10] show how a non-cooperative multi-
leader-follower game applied to the electricity market can be expressed as a GNE problem.
This latter model is an example of an Equilibrium Problem subject to Equilibrium Constraints
(EPEC) (see Ralph and Smeers [11] for an illustration of a related example of such a problem).
EPEC problems are more complex than the QV I problems discussed here where we concentrate
on GNEs that arise when players share a common good (like power, transport and telecommu-
nication networks), but are not valued by the market at a single price. In the literature, this
is referred to as a problem with shared constraints. The lack of a unique price for a shared
1Transmission System Operator (TSO) is a company that is responsible for operating, maintaining and developing
the transmission system for a control area and its interconnections. See ENTSO website.
2constraint makes the market incomplete. This is reected in a multiplicity of dual variables
of the common constraints. Our interest is about GNE problems that have an interpretation
of incomplete markets for resources described by shared constraints. Mathematically we are
interested in exploring solutions of the QV I where the dual variables of the shared constraints
dier.
The general situation is that a quasi-variational problem has a plurality of solutions that
include those of the underlying V I problem. In his seminal paper (see Theorem 6 [6]), Harker
proves that the V I solutions are the only points in the solution set of the QV I when the dual
variables associated to shared constraints are identical for all players. This has an important
implication: solving the V I gives a solution to the QV I. There is also a shortcoming, solving
the V I does not say anything about the other solutions of the QV I. Dierently from V I, only
few methods are available for solving GNE problems (see Fukushima [5] and Facchinei and
Kanzow [4] for a complete overview).
Recently, Fukushima ([5]) has introduced the new class of restricted GNE that can be con-
sidered as an extension of the normalized Nash Equilibrium. A normalized equilibrium, initially
introduced by Rosen [12], is a special GNE where the multipliers of the shared constraints are
equal among all players up to a constant factor. In his paper [5], Fukushima denes the re-
stricted GNE for the class of GNE problems with shared constraints and presents a controlled
penalty method to nd a restricted GNE. However, in some cases, it could be interesting to
have the full set of solutions of the GNE problem. A recent paper by Fukushima in collabora-
tion with Nabetani and Tseng (see [7]) suggests two parametrized V I approaches respectively
called price-directed and resource directed, to capture all GNEs.
The contribution of this paper can be summarized as follows. We discuss the economic
insight provided by the price-directed parametrization algorithm (see [7]) on market coupling
and on the organization of counter-trading applied to the restructured European electricity
system. Market coupling is currently implemented in France, Belgium and the Netherlands and
it will be soon extended to Germany. This market organization is based on the separation of the
energy and transmission markets. The energy market is subdivided into zones, each controlled
by a Power Exchange (PX2), that are interconnected by lines, with limited transfer capacity,
which provide a simplied representation of the grid. Taking stock of this information on the
interconnections, PXs clear energy markets, but the resulting ows may be not feasible with real
network. This forces TSOs to re-shue power ows in order to eliminate overows and restore
network feasibility. The set of these operations is known as counter-trading or re-dispatching.
The deriving costs change according to the degree of coordination of the dierent TSOs and
they are usually charged to power producers or consumers. This problem can be considered
as an illustration of a more general problem encountered for instance in hierarchical planning
in production management. We rst discuss the economic interpretation of the variational and
quasi-variational inequality problem and some of its implications for algorithmic purposes. We
then apply the methods to a set of counter-trading case studies and report the results as well as
the advantages and shortcoming encountered. The paper emphasises the numerical aspects of
dierent counter-trading models where TSOs operate in a more or less integrated way. These
models are applied to a six node network that we assume to be subdivided into two zones (North
2A Power Exchange (PX) is an operator with the mission of organizing and economically managing the electricity
market, while guaranteeing competition between producers.
3and South). These zones have an inter-connector with limited transfer capacity. Each zone is
controlled by a PX and a TSO. We assume that PXs are coordinated and then operate as if
they were a sole entity; while TSOs can be coordinated or uncoordinated. We rst model the
case where TSOs operate in a integrated way to then move to situations where TSOs are not
coordinated and have dierent controls on the counter-trading resources. A companion paper
goes in more detail into the economics of the problem (see Oggioni and Smeers [9]). The results
of a more realistic study are illustrated by Oggioni and Smeers in [8], where the analysis is
applied to a prototype of the North-Western European electricity market.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we recall the mathematical
background; Section 3 introduces the economic interpretation, the data and the network used
for the empirical analysis. Section 4 is devoted to the explanation of the models and some
theoretical results, while the results of the simulations are reported in Section 5. Finally, Section
6 concludes with the last observations.
2 Mathematical Background
This section reviews the mathematical instruments used in the paper. The QV I problem dened
by the pair QV I(F;K) is to nd a vector x 2 K(x) such that:
F(x)T(x   x)  0 8 x 2 K(x) (1)
where K(x) is a point to set mapping from <n into a subset of <n and F is a point-to-point
mapping from <n into itself.
There exists a strict correspondence between QV I and a related GNE problem dened as
follows. Suppose that each player i solves the following utility maximization problem, where its
strategy xi is aected by the strategy xNni of the other Nni players:
Maxxi ui(xi;xNni) (2)
s:t: xi 2 Ki(xNni)
A GNE of the game is thus dened as a point x = (x1;x2 ;:::;xn) 2 K(x) such that:
ui(x)  ui(xi;xNni) 8 xi 2 Ki(xNni) i 2 N
Ki : xNni  ! Xi is a point to set map which represents the ability of player Nni to inuence
the feasible strategy set of player i.
The QV I formulation of this GNE problem is then dened as follows:
 rxiui(xi;xNni)T(xi   xi)  0 8 xi 2 Ki(xNni) (3)
and the more compact form is:
F(x)T(x   x)  0 8 x 2 K(x) (4)
where FT(x)  ( rT
x1u1(x);:::; rT
xNuN(x)) and K(x) 
QN
i Ki(xNni).
Dierent particularizations of the solution set of the QV I have been oered in the literature.
They are presented in the following through an example that we complement with some economic
interpretations that will be important in the rest of the paper.
42.1 Particular cases
Assume an economic system with three players (N = 1;:::;3) and two common constraints
(m = 1;2) that each expresses a limitation in some resources. Each player i solves an optimiza-
tion problem taking into account the limitation of resources expressed in the two constraints.
The players' problems are stated below with the dual variables of their constraints indicated at
the right:
The rst player solves:
Minx11 = (x1)2 + x1x2   x1x3 (5)
x1   2x2 + x3  2:4 (1) (6)
x1 + x2 + x3  3 (1) (7)
x1  0 (!1) (8)
The second player's problem is:
Minx22 = (x2)2 + x1x2 + x2x3 (9)
x1   2x2 + x3  2:4 (2) (10)
x1 + x2 + x3  3 (2) (11)
x2  0 (!2) (12)
And nally the third player solves:
Minx33 = (x3)2 + x1x3 + x2x3 (13)
x1   2x2 + x3  2:4 (3) (14)
x1 + x2 + x3  3 (3) (15)
x3  0 (!3) (16)
Following Theorem 6 of Harker [6], we single out the solution of a QV I for which the dual
variables of all players' common constraints are identical and we write the KKT conditions of
these dierent problems as:
0  2x1 + x2   x3      ?x1  0 (17)
0  x1   2x2 + x3   2:4?  0 (18)
0  x1 + x2 + x3   3?  0 (19)
for the rst player and
0  2x2 + x1 + x3 + 2   ?x2  0 (20)
0  x1   2x2 + x3   2:4?  0 (21)
0  x1 + x2 + x3   3?  0 (22)
5for the second player. Finally for the third player:
0  2x3 + x1 + x2      ?x3  0 (23)
0  x1   2x2 + x3   2:4?  0 (24)
0  x1 + x2 + x3   3?  0 (25)
The solution of this three players' problem is x =[2:1;0:2;0:7]
T. This makes the two con-
straints binding and  and  amount to 0.167 and 3.533 respectively. We interpret this model as
one where a market allocates the common resources represented in the two constrains through
a single price system (one price for each constraint). We refer to this scenario as \case 1".
Rosen's ([12]) considers another solution of the QV I problem where the dual variables of
the shared constraints are equal among all players up to a constant factor ri that depends on
players, but not on the constraints. This is mathematically expressed as:
i = =ri i = 1;2;3 (26)
i = =ri i = 1;2;3 (27)
Rosen refers to this solution as normalized equilibrium. The complementarity formulation of
the problem is as follows:
0  2x1 + x2   x3   1   1?x1  0 (28)
0  x1   2x2 + x3   2:4?1  0 (29)
0  x1 + x2 + x3   3?1  0 (30)
for the rst player, while that of the second player is:
0  2x2 + x1 + x3 + 22   2?x2  0 (31)
0  x1   2x2 + x3   2:4?2  0 (32)
0  x1 + x2 + x3   3?2  0 (33)
Finally that of the third player is stated as:
0  2x3 + x1 + x2   3   3?x3  0 (34)
0  x1   2x2 + x3   2:4?3  0 (35)
0  x1 + x2 + x3   3?3  0 (36)
Rosen's normalized equilibrium is obtained when the dual variables of the shared constraints
are equal among all players up to a constant factor ri.
We denote this scenario as \case 2" and we interpret it as one where there is an imperfect
market for allocating the common resources of the two constraints. Prices tend to equalize, but
there remains a gap. This can easily be interpreted as the bid-ask spread found in insuciently
liquid markets. Assuming that r1 = 1:05, r2 = 1 and r3 = 0:95, the solution of the normalized
Nash equilibrium becomes x =[2:01;0:2;0:790]
T and the corresponding values of i and i are
as stated in Table 1.
6i Values i Values
1 0.127 1 3.302
2 0.134 2 3.467
3 0.141 3 3.650
Table 1: i and i values in the normalized equilibrium (case 2)
Fukushima ([5]) generalizes this notion and considers the more general case of a restricted
QV I or GNE problem by imposing that the relative values of dierent resources dier among
players. A tuple x = (x1;:::;xN) is said to be a restricted GNE, if there exists Lagrange
multipliers  = (v
i) ... that satisfy KKTv;v = 1;:::;N together with the additional conditions3:
 = (v
i) 2 
where  is a nonempty cone in <mN
+ . The class of restricted GNE extends the Rosen's normal-
ized equilibrium (see above for the denition of normalized equilibrium). In other words, one
has a restricted GNE when the ratio of shadow prices associated with the common resources is
neither too large nor too small for every pair of player4. Considering our three players example,

























One may be interested in other solutions of the QV I. Suppose for instance that we want to
impose 1 =  + 0:05, 2 =  and 3 =    0:05, 1 =  + 1, 2 =  and 3 =    1. The
solution of this particular GNE is x =[2:625;0:2;0:175]
T and the corresponding values of i
and i are reported in Table 2. This is the kind of GNE that we want to tackle in this paper
and, in particular, the dierence between dual variables can be interpreted as a lack of arbitrage
in incomplete markets. This is our \case 3".
i Values i Values
1 0.392 1 4.883
2 0.342 2 3.883
3 0.292 3 2.883
Table 2: i and i values at equilibrium (case 3)
A particular case of the above is to impose 1 =  + 0:05, 2 =  and 3 =    0:05 while
i = . The solution to this GNE thus becomes x =[2:125;0:2;0:675]
T with the corresponding
i and i in Table 3. The interpretation of this situation is an economic system where some
3Directly taken from Fukushima [5].
4Directly taken from Fukushima [5].
7resources are eectively priced by the market (those that have identical dual variables), but
others are not or only imperfectly priced. We denote it as \case 4".
i Values i Values
1 0.225 1 3.350
2 0.175 2 3.350
3 0.125 3 3.350
Table 3: i and i values at equilibrium (case 4)
We motivate our interest in that problem in Section 3 where we discuss a real world example
of that situation. We now explain that the parametrized V I approach proposed by Nabetani,
Tseng, Fukushima (NTF hereafter), that we briey present next, provides a particularly attrac-
tive way to handle that problem, both numerically and in terms of its economic interpretation.
2.2 The NTF price directive algorithm
Consider the following GNE dened as follows. For each i = 1;:::;N, nd xi such that for
given xNni optimally solves the following convex optimization problem:
Minxi i(xi;xNni) (39)
s:t: g(xi;xNni)  0 xi 2 Ki(xNni)
where g(xi;xNni) are the players' common constraints. The parametrized V I approach pro-
posed by Nabetani, Tseng, Fukushima solves that GNE problem through a family of V Is
dened as follows. Consider a problem V I(F;K) where the mapping F : <n ! <n is dened
as follows:
F(x) = (rxii(x) + rxig(x)i)N
i=1 (40)
and i is a parameter assigned to each player i. These authors show that the solution set of
a GNE problem is a subset of the solution set of these parametrized V I(F;K). In Theorem
3.3 of [7], they also give conditions for identifying when a solution of V I(F;K) is eectively a
GNE. Consider the KKT conditions for V I(F;K):
0 2 [(rxii(x) + rxig(x)i) + rxig(x)]; i = 1;:::;N
0  ?g(x)  0; xi 2 Xi; i = 1;:::;N
Theorem 3.3 says that for any  2 <mN
+ and any (x;) 2 <n  <m satisfying the KKT
conditions indicated above, a sucient condition for x to be a GNE is that:
hg(x);ii = 0; i = 1;:::;N: (41)
If in addition a constraint qualication condition holds at x, then (41) is also a necessary
condition for x to be a GNE. This algorithm can be easily adapted to the problem treated in
this paper.
The following section provides the economic intuition that motivates this problem. We rst
present the problem in general terms and then adapt it to the particular situation that is treated
in Section 3.3.
83 Economic interpretation
3.1 A general production context
Nash equilibria are commonly used in economics to describe markets aected by market power.
In contrast, we concentrate in this paper on markets where all agents are price takers and hence
there is no market power. This was the context adopted by Debreu and Arrow and Debreu in
[3] and [1] for introducing social equilibrium. Specically we consider the following social equi-
librium problem that arises in production management. Consider the problem of decentralizing
the activities of an organization into dierent Business Units (BU) that is each evaluated on its
own performance. The interactions between the business units are of two types. First, actions
of one BU can inuence the payo (performance index) of another BU. Second, all BUs share
common constraints (resource availability or operations constraint) with the implication that
the actions of one BU can change the remaining resources available to the other BUs. Both
types of interactions are known by economists as externalities. Negative externalities create inef-
ciencies; positive externalities create benets. While the organization can in principle achieve
its best result by an overall optimization, it is believed that the centralization of operations
required by this optimization decreases individual incentives to be ecient (moral hazard in
economic parlance).
The decentralization process consists in assembling activities in BUs and organizing internal
markets for shared resources. We explained that integrating all operations would maximize
eciency where it is not for a degradation of individual incentives. In a similar way, eciency
justies creating an internal market for all common resources or restrictions in the decentralized
organisation (see the treatment of common constraints in Dantzig-Wolfe decomposition), except
if, following Williamson's theory [14], externalizing transactions through these markets would
increase costs with respect to keeping them inside an integrated rm. There is thus a trade-o in
decentralization between increasing individual incentives towards eciency and incurring costs
because of loss of coordination. We justify the introduction of our problem as an instrument to
measure the economic cost resulting from the loss of coordination in decentralized operations.
The economic problem can be analyzed in two stages. A rst question is to group activities
into BUs, the other is to decide which resource or restriction to allocate through a market
and which not. The rst problem can be handled by testing dierent groupings of activities.
Suppose, in order to treat the second question, that the decomposition of the overall organisation
in BUs is dened. The question then arises as to the creation of an internal market for common
resources or restrictions. The resources or constraints allocated through an internal market
have a common price charged by all BUs. The other resources can be valued dierently by
the dierent BUs without any market reconciling these dierent valuations into a single price
or opportunity cost. Ineciency arises from both improper grouping of activities and price
dierences that signal residual arbitrage possibilities. Assessing this ineciency can then be
done either by measuring the additional cost incurred by the decentralized organization or
by valuing the remaining arbitrage possibilities. The NTF price directed algorithm provides
a particularly attractive way to tackle that problem. We apply these general ideas to the
particular problem of counter-trading in restructured electricity systems, that we describe after
introducing a GNE formulation of the above discussion.
93.2 Formulation in terms of GNE
3.2.1 Problem statement
We formulate the above problem in the following abstract way. There are two BUs, each noted
i = N;S (in order to use the same notation as in the rest of the paper). Each BU maximizes
a utility function Ui(x) taking into account both common and individual constraints. Some of
the constraints are considered suciently important for organizing a common market. Others
are seen as less important and hence left to informal arrangements.
Player N solves the following problem:
MaxxNUN(xN;xS) (42)
s.t.
XN(xN) = 0 (N) (43)
Y (xN;xS) = Y N(xN) + Y S(xS)  0 (N) (44)
Z(xN;xS) = ZN(xN) + ZS(xS)  0 (N) (45)
where the function UN and XN are respectively the utility and the own constraint of player
N; Y and Z are the common and separable constraints, Y denoting those for which a common




XS(xS) = 0 (S) (47)
Y (xN;xS) = Y N(xN) + Y S(xS)  0 (S) (48)
Z(xN;xS) = ZN(xN) + ZS(xS)  0 (S) (49)
The combination of these two optimization problems constitutes a Generalized Nash Equilibrium
problem. Referring to the above interpretation we impose that the dual variables N and S are
equal because they can be interpreted as a transfer price in the common market of constraints
Y . In contrast, N and S can be dierent because no internal market has been created for
these common constraints. N and S refer to BUs' own constraints and hence can be expected
to be dierent. This is a particular Generalized Nash Equilibrium in the sense that some of the
constraints are priced by the market and hence their dual variables are equal for both players.
But the market is incomplete in the sense that it does not cover all common constraints and the
dual variables of the uncovered constraints can be dierent. The theory of GNE tells us that
there may be several solutions to this problem, implying that the outcome of the organization
is intrinsically ambiguous. It is thus relevant to inquire whether these dierent outcomes can
be far apart some of them being quite inecient compared to the outcome where all constraints
would be priced by a complete market. Conversely one may wonder whether there are cases
where there is a single outcome (the QV I and the associated V I have identical solution sets).
We explore this question by applying the parametrized variational inequality approach de-
scribed by Nabetani, Tseng and Fukushima in [7] and construct the following parametrized
model.
10MaxxN;SUN(xN;xS) + US(xN;xS) + (ZN(xN))N + (ZS(xS))S (50)
s.t.
XN(xN) = 0 (N) (51)
XS(xS) = 0 (S) (52)
Y (xN;xS) = Y N(xN) + Y S(xS)  0 () (53)
Z(xN;xS) = ZN(xN) + ZS(xS)  0 () (54)
Changing the  parameters leads to dierent Generalized Nash Equilibria provided that posi-
tive  are associated to a positive . There is only a single GNE if it is impossible to generate
dierent GNE by modifying the . Assuming adequate constraint qualication and the opti-
mization problem is feasible, this can only happen if the optimization problem is unbounded.
This occurs if it does not have any primal dual solution, a property that can be checked on
the complementarity theorem obtained from the KKT conditions of the optimization problem.









@xN ?xN  0
0 
@xSUS(xN;xS)
@xS + S @xSZS(xS)





@xS ?xS  0
0  Y (xN;xS)?  0 (55)
0  Z(xN;xS)?  0 (56)
XN(xN) = 0 (N) (57)
XS(xS) = 0 (S) (58)
3.2.2 Assessing ineciencies
The above model can be used to test the ineciency of a particular organization. These arise
from two sources. One is in the delineation of the individual constraints of the BUs (the
X constraints) when they result from an ex ante allocation of some common resources. The
other source of ineciency is the absence of a common market for the resources that remain
common. This is is expressed by the dierence of valuation of these resources by the BU (the
dual variables). In all cases this implies a change of the utility function value of the BUs. It is
this approach that we illustrate in the following application taken from the restructuring of the
European electricity market.
113.3 Counter-trading in restructured electricity markets
The operations of the electricity system under the regulatory regime is the paradigm of the fully
centralized and optimized organisation of operations: all machines operating in the short run are
under the control of a single optimization problem. The underlying philosophy of the restruc-
turing of the sector is that decentralising operations improve the incentive of individual agents
(generators, traders, consumers) to be ecient, possibly at the cost of some loss of coordination
of operations. The question is to nd a good trade-o by gaining on incentives without loosing
too much on coordination. We here consider a particular problem that arises in the European
context of electricity restructuring namely the organisation of counter-trading after the clearing
of the energy market by Power Exchanges. A full description of the overall problem, namely
the so called market coupling, would lead us too far away from the numerical objective of this
paper and we therefore report a brief summary in Appendix A (see the companion paper [9] for
more details). We here restrict ourselves to the subproblem of counter-trading that we describe
on the basis of a six node example initially presented by Chao and Peck in [2].
3.3.1 The test problem
Consider the six node network depicted in Figure 1 introduced by Chao and Peck (see [2]).
Figure 1: Six node market (Chao and Peck (1998))
The network accounts for eight lines of which only two have limited capacity. These are line
(1-6) and (2-5) with a respective capacity of 200 and 250 MW. Kirchho's laws are represented
by a Power Transfer Distribution Factor (PTDF) matrix that indicates the portions of energy
that, after being injected into a node or before being withdrawn from a hub node (node 6 in the
example) ows through the lines. In this example, the PTDF matrix concerns only lines (1-6)
and (2-5) and its elements are reported in Table 4. Electricity is produced in nodes i = 1;2;4
and consumed in nodes j = 3;5;6. Marginal production cost (c(qi)) and inverse demand (w(qj))
functions are given in Table 5.
12Power (1 MW) Power ow on Power ow on






6 (hub) 0 0
Table 4: PTDF of the 6 node market (Chao and Peck (1998))







Table 5: Demand and cost functions of the 6 node market (Chao and Peck (1998))
3.3.2 Counter-trading
Assume a zonal energy market decomposed in two Northern and Southern zones as depicted in
Figure 2 (see [9] for more details). Zones are currently associated to countries in Europe and
there is one PX and one TSO per country. We refer to the Northern and Southern TSOs as
TSON and TSOS respectively.
Consider a set of energy trades resulting from the clearing of the energy market by the
PXs in market coupling (see Appendix A). These trades have been obtained on the basis of a
simplied representation of the grid (like in Figure 2) and hence can sometimes lead to excessive
ows on some lines of the real network. Counter-trading is the operations whereby TSOs buy
incremental or decremental injections at dierent nodes of the grid so as to modify the ows
on the lines and make them compatible with the real capabilities of the grid, namely network
in Figure 1, in real time. Counter-trading does not change the energy transactions cleared in
the energy market as these are settled at the prices arrived at by the PXs. Counter-trading is
an other market that is settled separately. It can be organized in dierent ways of which we
discuss a few possibilities.
3.3.3 Counter-trading is fully optimized
We rst consider an arrangement where both TSOs operate as a single entity. This corresponds
to an overall optimization of all counter-trading operations by an entity that has access to
all counter-trading resources (incremental and decremental injections and withdrawals). This
13Figure 2: Two zones market
implicitly assumes that the gains accruing from an overall optimization exceed the costs incurred
because of the full harmonization and integrated control of the TSOs.
3.3.4 Counter-trading is decentralised
The second arrangement takes place when the two TSOs retain separate operations, but share
common constraints or resources. The capacities of the lines joining the Northern and Southern
zones are common constraints used by both TSOs. They can be priced or not depending on
whether one introduces a market for transmission at the counter-trading level or not. We want to
check the impact of this pricing on the overall eciency of counter-trading. Common economic
sense indeed suggests that the inception of a transmission capacity market increases eciency.
Counter-trading resources at the generator or consumer levels are the other set of resources.
They may be shared by the two TSOs or not depending on the organisation. When shared,
we assume, in compliance with general non discrimination principles that both TSOs access
them at the same price. We distinguish three extents of sharing counter-trading resources.
A rst situation is the one where there is eectively an internal market for counter-trading
resources: both TSOs can have access to all incremental and decremental injections in both
zones. A second case is the one where this common market exists, but is limited by quantitative
constraints that are interpreted in terms of security: a TSO can only access part of the counter-
trading resources of the other zone. The third situation occurs when there is no common market
for counter-trading resources. We also want to assess the impact of these dierent organisations
on the overall eciency of counter-trading. We here present the structure of the model and
refer to a companion paper [9] for a broader analysis of numerical results.
3.3.5 Note on counter-trading costs
Re-dispatching costs interact with the PX's bids and create a link between the market coupling
and counter-trading problems. This is not discussed here, but illustrated in a companion paper
(see [9]). For the sake of readability we report the average counter-trading cost  because it is
easy to interpret and compare to the energy price. It is obtained by dividing the total counter-
trading cost (TCC) that varies with the model considered by the total generation (
P
i=1;2;4 qi).






The original NTF paper is stated in terms of variational inequality problems; our example deals
with variational inequality models that are integrable into optimization problems. We therefore
only refer to optimization models, using the following nomenclature:
Sets
 l=(1-6);(2-5): Lines with limited capacity;
 n = 1;2;3;4;5;6: Nodes
 i(n) = 1;2;4: Subet of production nodes;
 j(n) = 3;5;6: Subet of consumption nodes
Parameters
 PTDFl;n: Power Transfer Distribution Factor (PTDF) matrix of node n on line l;
  Fl: Limit of ow through lines l = (1   6);(2   5);
 qn: Power traded (bought or sold) in node n (MWh); these are determined in the market
coupling problem and are taken as data in the counter-trading models.
Variables
 qn: Counter-trading variables: Incremental or decremental quantities of electricity with
respect to qn (MWh).
We assume that all agents are price takers. They bid in both the day-ahead and counter-
trading markets. We do not separately model a balancing market taking care of deviations with
respect to day-ahead.
4.1 Counter-trading operations are optimized
Assume that TSON and TSOS buy incremental and decremental quantities of electricity qn
in their domestic market (N = (1;2;3) and S = (4;5;6) respectively) and coordinate operations
to remove congestion at the minimal counter-trading cost. This is stated in the optimization
problem (59)-(65).
The global re-dispatching costs appears in the objective function (59). There are two classes
of constraints. The rst class involves both TSOs and includes the balance equations (60), (61)
and the transmission capacity constraints (62) and (63). Conditions (60) and (61) impose that
the sum of the incremental injections (qi=1;2;4) and withdrawals (qj=3;5;6) equals zero. This
expresses that the amount of energy cleared by the PX is not aected by counter-trading. As
alluded to before, this rule separates the trading of energy (the qn that remain unchanged)
and the counter-trading operations (the qn variables that are counter-trading operations) in
two dierent markets. The dual variables 

l associated with (62) and (63) respectively dene
15the marginal values of the capacited lines (1-6) and (2-5) in the two ow directions. Because
there is a single optimization problem for both TSOs, they see the same value for the congested
lines. In the second class, we group constraints (64)-(65) that are specic to the geographic zone
covered by each TSO. The non-negativity constraints (64) state that the quantities of electricity
demanded and produced in the Northern zone plus the incremental and decremental injections
of the TSON have to be non-negative. An identical reasoning applies in condition (65) for the



























PTDFi;l(qi + qi)  
X
j=3;5;6






PTDFi;l(qi + qi)  
X
j=3;5;6
PTDFj;l(qj + qj)]  0 (
 
l ) (63)
qn + qn  0 n = 1;2;3 (N
n ) (64)
qn + qn  0 n = 4;5;6 (S
n) (65)
Problem (59)-(65) is strictly convex and admits a unique solution. This model provides
the benchmark for evaluating other organizations of counter-trading. Finally, the average re-
dispatching costs  is computed by dividing the objective function (59) by
P
i=1;2;4 qi.
4.2 Decentralized counter-trading Model 1: TSON and TSOS have full
access to all re-dispatching resources
TSON and TSOS no longer cooperate for removing network congestion, but still have full
access to all counter-trading resources of the system. This means that a TSO can buy and sell
incremental and decremental injections and withdrawals in the control area of the other TSO
(e.g. TSON can also counter-trade in the Southern zone and vice versa). This situation can
be interpreted as the creation of an internal market of counter-trading resources. Denoting the
counter-trading variables of the Northern and Southern TSOs respectively as qN
n=1;:::;6 and
qS
n=1;:::;6, the following presents the problem of TSON, the problem of TSOS is similar and
given in Appendix C.
4.2.1 Problem of TSON
TSON solves the optimization problem (66)-(71). It minimizes its re-dispatching costs (66) tak-
ing into account its balance constraints (67) and (68) (each TSO must remain in balance) and the
counter-trading actions of the other TSO. These actions appear in the transmission constraints
16(69)-(70), and the overall non-negativity constraint (71) on generation and consumption. Note































































j )]  0 (
N; 
l ) (70)
where l = (1   6);(2   5)
qn + qN
n + qS
n  0 8n (N
n ) (71)
4.2.2 An ecient Generalized Nash Equilibrium
The combination of both TSOs' problems suggests a Generalized Nash Equilibrium model that
we want to interpret in terms of markets for counter-trading resources and transmission capac-
ities.
A rst step towards the creation of an internal market of counter-trading resources is that
both TSON and TSOS have access to the same incremental and decremental injections and
withdrawals. This is stated in the constraints (67)-(68) of the TSON and (114)-(115) of the
TSOS's problems (see Appendix C). The intended eect is that this access should be at the
same price for both TSOs. This remains to be proved. One may also wish to create a market
of transmission capacities. This is expressed by the constraints imposed on the dual variables
of constraints (71) for TSON and the analogous constraint for TSOS. Imposing the equality
of these dual variables amounts to assume a market of transmission capacities as both TSOs
see the same price for transmission resources. In contrast, there is no market for line capacity
in the counter-trading system if the dual variables of (69)-(70) for TSON and (116)-(117) for
TSOS can be dierent.
The two assumptions of transmission market can be easily cast in the NTF parametrized
optimization problem (72)-(80) (a parametrized V I problem in general). The objective function
(72) combines the actions of both TSOs and also includes the parameters5 N;S; that perturb




l associated with the common transmission constraints (77) and
5The apeces N,S of the parameters 
N;S; indicate \North" and \South"; while the sign \+" and \-" indicate the
ow directions. The positive direction is from the Northern to the Southern zone; the negative direction is from the
Southern to the Northern zone.
17(78). Setting the N;S; to zero implies equal dual variables of the transmission constraints
and hence a transmission market. Setting them at dierent values represents the case where
there is no transmission market. While (77) and (78) are common to TSON and TSOS, the
balance conditions (73), (74), (75) and (76) apply to each individual TSO. Conditions (73)-(74)
are identical to (67)-(68) and refer to TSON, while (75) and (76) regard TSOS (compare (114)







































































































j )]  0 (
 
l ) (78)
where l = (1   6);(2   5)
qn + qN
n + qS




n  0 8n (S
n) (80)
While the above formulation accounts for the fact that both TSOs have access to the same
counter-trading resources (balance conditions (73), (74), (75) and (76)), it does not imply yet
that they see the same prices for them as one would expect in an internal market of these
resources. This relation is established in the following propositions.





















= 0. The solution of problem (72)-(80)









Proof 1 See Appendix E. 
18The implication of this proposition is that a GNE solution of this problem, if it exists, has
identical dual variables for the transmission constraints. This amounts to creating a market
of transmission resources. It also implies a single price for counter-trading resources thereby
completing the proof that we did create an internal market of these resources. This is stated in
the following proposition.





N;1 = S;1 and N;2 = S;2 .
Proof 2 See Appendix F. 
The interpretation of this second proposition is twofold. From a mathematical point of view
it expresses that the solution set of the QV I associated to this GNE problem is identical to
the solution set of the related V I problem. This identies a class of problems for which the
solutions sets of the QV I and V I are identical. The economic interpretation of that problem is
that introducing a common access to counter-trading resources, implicitly implies the existence
of a market for transmission resources and an internal (non discriminatory) market of counter-
trading resources. In other words, an internal market of counter-trading resources \completes"
the market.
The next implication is an expected result. A complete market is ecient; the outcome
should be identical to the one of the full optimization of counter-trading. This also proves that
the solution of the GNE (72)-(80), if it exists, is unique. This is expressed in the following
corollaries.
Corollary 1 Suppose the solution to coordinated counter-trading problem (59)-(65) exists. Then,
the solution of the GNE problem (72)-(80) exists and coincides with that of the coordinated
counter-trading problem (59)-(65).
Proof 3 See Appendix G. 
Corollary 2 The solution of the GNE problem (72)-(80) is unique.
Proof 4 Since the solution to problem (59)-(65) is unique (see Section 4.1), thanks to Corollary
1, we can immediately conclude that the solution to problem (72)-(80) is unique too. 
4.3 Decentralized counter-trading Model 2: TSON and TSOS have
limited access to part of the counter-trading resources
4.3.1 A partial market of counter-trading resources
The model presented in Section 4.2 assumes that both TSOs have full access to all re-dispatching
resources. We depart from this assumption here and model the case where both TSON and
TSOS have a limited access to the counter-trading resources located outside of their control area.
This means that the Northern TSO's purchase of Southern counter-trading resources is limited
and conversely. The optimization problems of each TSO are immediately derived from those in
Section 4.2 by adding upper and lower constraints on the variables dening re-dispatching in
the zone not directly controlled by this TSO. We do not report these individual optimization
19problems here, but directly present the model in the Nabetani, Tseng and Fukushima's form.
The additional constraints (86) and (87) impose the upper and lower bounds on the actions of
two TSOs in the jurisdiction that is not under their direct control. Condition (86) limits the
TSON's purchase of Southern counter-trading resources and condition (87) does the same for
TSOS in the Northern zone. This arrangement is likely to be more realistic (\pragmatic" in
usual parlance) than the above creation of an internal market: TSOs that are not integrated
will probably insists on keeping resources under their sole control. We shall see that giving up
the internal market of counter-trading resources can have dramatic consequences. We discuss
these consequences in principle in this paper together with some numerical results. We further
elaborate on these numerical results in our companion paper (see [9]).
4.3.2 Inecient Generalized Nash Equilibrium
Let qN
n and qS
n be respectively the bounds (in absolute value) imposed on TSOs resorting to
outside resources. The other conditions and constraints are as in Section 4.2. The NTS problem
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l ) (89)
where l = (1   6);(2   5)
qn + qN
n + qS




n  0 8n (S
n) (91)
The following proposition is a preliminary; it gives the condition for the existence of Gener-
alized Nash Equilibrium and is a direct application of the NTF results.





















= 0. If the solution to problem (81)-(91)
exists, it is a GNE.
Proof 5 The proof is a direct application of NTF's Theorem 3.3 (see [7]). 
In contrast with the case of the internal market of counter-trading resources, the outcome
of the market is here ambiguous: there may be several GNEs and they may dier in terms of
eciency. We rst state that we fall back on the case of the internal market of counter-trading
resources (decentralized Model 1) if none of the quantitative restrictions of cross zonal resources
is binding. This means that the resources remaining of the exclusive control of the zonal TSO
are not too important.





















= 0. If the solution to problem (81)-





the GNE is unique and identical to the solution of the optimized counter-trading.
Proof 6 Apply the proof of Appendix E after noting that the KKT conditions of problem (72)-
(80) are identical to those of problem (81)-(91) when cross zonal quantitative restrictions are
not binding. 
As expected, things change when some of the cross zonal quantitative restrictions are binding.
The following proposition states that the solution of the GNE (81)-(91), if it exists, is not unique
when some of the quantitative limitations on counter-trading resources are binding.
Proposition 5 Suppose that a GNE obtained by solving (81)-(91) has some cross zonal re-
strictions binding. The valuation of the transmission capacities by both agents are identical when
all 
N=S;+= 


















Proof 7 See Appendix I. 
This proposition disentangles the impact of two market incompletenesses. Setting all  to
zero creates a market for transmission capacities even in the absence of a market of counter-
trading resources. This is a step in the right direction: a transmission market does not restore
the full eciency of counter-trading, but it improves it. The absence of a transmission mar-
ket can lead to dierent inecient outcomes. These can be obtained by introducing a wedge
















= 0 for a GNE are maintained). This is illustrated in the numerical results
through further examples and expanded in our companion paper (see [9]).
Last it may be useful to recall that counter-trading is not always possible.
21Corollary 3 The solution of the GNE problem does not necessarily exist.
Proof 8 It suces to take a case where the NTF problem is infeasible. 
4.4 Decentralized counter-trading Model 3: TSON and TSOS operate
only in their own control area
4.4.1 A segmented market of counter-trading resources
This section presents a more extreme situation. The following model, directly presented in
the Nabetani, Tseng and Fukushima's formulation, describes a transmission market where each
TSO manages the re-dispatching resources of its own area only, taking as given the action of
the other TSO. There is no additional transaction from a TSO into the other TSO zone.
The problem is formulated through relations (92) to (100). The objective function (92)
globalizes the counter-trading costs of the two TSOs. This problem is subject to the shared
transmission constraints (97)-(98) and the balance constraints of TSON ((93) and (94)) and
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22where l = (1   6);(2   5)
qn + qN
n  0 n = 1;2;3 (N
n ) (99)
qn + qS
n  0 n = 4;5;6 (S
n) (100)


















with a similar formula for the Southern area. A \global" average-dispatching cost can also be de-
























4.4.2 Further inecient Generalized Nash Equilibrium
The following propositions are particular cases of those obtained in the preceding section. The
rst statement again directly obtains from NTF's results: it simply states the conditions under
which the solution of this problem is a GNE.





















= 0. If the solution to problem (92) to
(100) exists, it is a GNE.
Proof 9 The proof is a direct application of NTF's Theorem 3.3 (see [7]). 
There is no market of counter-trading resources in this case and there may thus be dierent
GNEs. The following proposition states that the GNE solution of the (92) to (100), if it exists,
is not unique.
Proposition 7 Suppose a GNE obtained by solving (92) to (100) exist. The valuation of the
transmission capacities by both agents are identical when all 
N=S;+= 


















Proof 10 See Appendix K. 
These comments are parallel to those of Section 4.3.2. As already explained before setting
all  to zero creates a market for transmission capacities that can only improve eciency even
without an internal market of counter-trading resources. One can assess the range of possible
ineciencies by introducing a wedge between the valuations of the transmission constraints us-
ing the  of the TSOs.
Last we again recall that there may not exist a GNE because counter-trading is not possible.
Corollary 4 The solution of the GNE problem does not necessarily exist.
Proof 11 It suces to take a case where the NFT problem is infeasible. 
235 Results
This section illustrates the dierent models of counter-trading starting from injections as re-
ported in Table 6. These are obtained by solving a market coupling problem of the type
described in Appendix A. The reader is referred to Oggioni and Smeers [9] for more details on
this problem.
q1 q2 q3 q4 q5 q6
366.667 266.667 183.333 166.667 283.333 333.333
Table 6: Nodal demand and generation (MWh)
5.1 Optimized counter-trading
The optimization of counter-trading refers to an organization where TSOs fully cooperate to
relieve congestion. Applying this principle to the network depicted in Figure 1 we nd a counter-
trading cost of 1,145.833 e, which in average amounts to 1.432 e/MWh. The re-dispatched
quantities are indicated in Table 7; there is a net counter-trading ow from South to North
equal to 50 MWh. Line (1-6) is congested in the North-South direction and its marginal value
is 40 e/MWh.
q1 q2 q3 q4 q5 q6
-66.666 33.333 16.666 33.333 16.666 -33.333
Table 7: Re-dispatching quantities (MWh)
As we will see in the following, the coordinated counter-trading model is relatively ecient.
Because it is a cooperative solution, some regions may be better o by not participating. We do
not deal with that question and assume that market operators are able to re-distribute resources
among market players in such a way that no player or zone is worse o than by not participating.
5.2 Decentralized counter-trading Model 1: TSOs have full access to
all counter-trading resources
Assume that TSON and TSOS can access all counter-trading resources. Setting all \
N;S;
l "
equal to zero (compare to the model discussed in Section 4.2), the problem can be interpreted
as a market where both TSOs equally value capacities; this simulates a market of transmission
capacities. Numerically, we fall back to the solution of the optimized counter-trading problem.
Applying dierent \
N;S;
l " with the view of testing dierent valuations of transmission capaci-
ties, and hence the absence of a transmission market, always leads to unbounded NTF problems.
There is no primal dual solution to the NTF problem and hence no GNE. This complies with
the theory: as stated in Section 4.2.2 an internal market of counter-trading resources implies a
market of transmission capacities.
24The value of the dual variable of line (1-6) in the model where all \
N;S;
l " are equal to





(1 6) = 40 leads again to the solution of the optimized counter-trading, but with
the dual variables of the transmission constraints all equal to zero. Re-dispatching quantities
are given in Table 7. The sole important gure is the total (the sum over the two TSOs)
re-dispatching; the allocation of this total between the two agents is arbitrary.
5.3 Imperfectly coordinated counter-trading Model 2: TSON and TSOS
have limited access to part of the counter-trading resources
The situation changes when we constraint the access of a TSO to counter-trading resources in
the other jurisdiction. Suppose limits of one TSO's access to resources in the other zone as
given in Table 8. These are selected by halving the counter-trading ows from South to North
obtained for optimized counter-trading (compare Table 7). Taking into account these limits,
we run ve cases that dier by the values assigned to the parameters \
N=S;
l ". Results are
reported in Table 9. Recall that  denes the average counter-trading cost. The bottom of
Table 9 reports the total counter-trading costs (TCC) and the counter-trading costs of the two








33.333 16.666 8.333 16.666 8.333 16.666
Table 8: Limits on the action of the two TSOs (MWh)
These dierent cases are meant to produce dierent Generalized Nash Equilibria. Cases 1
and 2 are obtained with equal  for the two TSOs and hence represent the impact of a market
of transmission capacities. The constraints on cross zonal access to resources are not binding
and the solution is identical to the one of the optimized counter-trading. The policy implication
of this nding is interesting: this case allows individual TSOs to retain the exclusive control on
some of their plants, which is a limitation to the internal market of counter-trading resources.
But the creation of a transmission market overcomes the negative consequences of that limitation
and allows one to restore eciency. The other cases assume TSOs with dierent , therefore
modeling the absence of a transmission market. This leads to dierent phenomena.
Supposes rst that the sole 
N;+
(1 6) is positive and equal to 40 (case 3). There is no transmis-
sion market, which creates another GNE. Dierent valuations of the common line (1-6) capacity
signal economic ineciencies as can be seen by the increase of 164.773 e of the re-dispatching
costs compared to Case 1. The average re-dispatching cost becomes 1.638 e/MWh. The result
of the counter-trading activity is a net ow of 36.364 MWh going from South to North. TSON's
re-dispatching costs amount to 1,454.077 e, while TSOS benets from the operations as can
be seen from its negative re-dispatching costs. Again, line (1-6) is congested and its marginal
value becomes 42.424 e/MWh; this increase with respect to the 40 observed in the optimal
counter-trading reects the ineciency created by the absence of the transmission market.
Consider now the alternative arrangement where we impose 
S;+
(1 6) = 40 (case 4). The
counter-trading ow from South to North is of 43.284 MWh. This case is more ecient than
25Case 1 Case 2 Case 3 Case 4 Case 5

N;+
(1 6) 0.000 40.000 40.000 0.000 80.000

N;+
(2 5) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000

S;+
(1 6) 0.000 40.000 0.000 40.000 20.000

S;+
(2 5) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
MV line (1-6) 40.000 0.000 42.424 40.995 22.667
 (e/MWh) 1.432 1.432 1.638 1.535 1.862
CCN (e) 722.198 763.860 1,454.077 -236.485 1,796.357
CCS (e) 423.640 381.970 -143.470 1,464.408 -306.769
TCC (e) 1,145.833 1,145.833 1,310.606 1,227.923 1,489.588
Table 9: 
N=S;
l values, Marginal Value (MV) of congested line (1-6), average re-dispatching cost
() and TSOs' counter-trading costs in dierent cases
Case 3, but counter-trading costs are still higher than in Case 1. In contrast with Case 3, TSON
now gains from counter-trading, while TSOS incurs additional re-dispatching costs. Line (1-6)
is still congested with a marginal value of 40.995 e/MWh (slightly higher than the 40 e/MWh
of the optimal counter-trading).
Case 5 shows the worst degradation of all. The  of the TSOs relative to line (1-6) are
indicated in Table 9. Global re-dispatching costs amount to 1,489.588 e. TSON incurs most
of this cost while TSOS still benets. The net re-dispatch amounts to 30 MWh from South to
North. The marginal value of line (1-6) is now 22.667 e/MWh.
5.4 Imperfectly coordinated counter-trading Model 3: TSOs control
the counter-trading resources of their area only
Going one step further, suppose that TSOs remove congestion on the interconnection by only
acquiring counter-trading resources in their jurisdiction. In other words, re-dispatching quanti-
ties sum to zero in each zone and there is no exchange of re-dispatching resources between the
two zones.
This should increase ineciency; we consider dierent cases and report the results in Table
10. \
N;S;
l " are all equal to zero in Case 1. Recall that this simulates a transmission market.
Ineciency is highlighted by signicant re-dispatching costs of 2,520.833 e with average value
of 3.151 e/MWh. Both TSOs counter-trade and TSON face the highest cost. Line (1-6) is
congested in the positive direction and has a marginal value of 146.667 e/MWh! Parallel to





(1 6) = 146:667. This is Case 2 reported in Table 10. Attributing this particular
value to the  of both TSOs, we get again the results of Case 1, even though the dual variable
of line (1-6) capacity falls to zero.





equal to 146.667. These cases have identical average and total re-dispatching costs that are also
the worst among the scenarios considered. Parallel to what we observed with a restricted internal
26Case 1 Case 2 Case 3 Case 4 Case 5

N;+
(1 6) 0.000 146.667 146.667 0.000 102.667

N;+
(2 5) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000

S;+
(1 6) 0.000 146.667 0.000 146.667 44.000

S;+
(2 5) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
MV line (1-6) 146.667 0.000 48.889 97.778 63.555
 (e/MWh) 3.151 3.151 3.851 3.851 3.263
CCN (e) 1,680.556 1,680.556 2,987.658 746.912 2,158.581
CCS (e) 840.278 840.278 93.363 2,334.109 451.882
TCC (e) 2,520.833 2,520.833 3,081.021 3,081.021 2,610.463
Table 10: 
N=S;
l values, Marginal Value (MV) of congested line (1-6), average re-dispatching cost
() and TSOs' counter-trading costs in dierent cases
market of counter-trading resources (Model 2), TSOS signicantly reduces its re-dispatch costs
in Case 3, while TSON benets in Case 4.
In Case 5, we assume that 
N;+
(1 6) = 102:667 and 
S;+
(1 6) = 44:000. These values are re-
spectively the 70% and 30% of 146.667. Under this alternative assumption, system ineciency
increases, in comparison with Cases 1 and 2. Both TSOs face counter-trading costs whose global
average is 3.263 e/MWh.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we discuss the economic and mathematical insights provided by the application
of the notion of Generalized Nash Equilibrium and its computation through the Nabetani,
Tseng and Fukushima's algorithm for Quasi-Variational Inequality problems applied to a market
design problem arising in the restructuring of the European electricity market. Specically,
we study dierent degrees of coordination in counter-trading activity in the context of the
implementation of \Market Coupling" in the European electricity market. We also explain that
the approach applies in general to problems of restructuring of an integrated organization into
dierent Business Units.
The reference case for an ecient counter-trading is the overall optimization by a single
integrated Transmission System Operator. Full optimization minimizes the cost of removing
congestion. Even though ecient, this solution may require too much horizontal integration for
being politically acceptable. Alternatives need thus be considered: we consider three organiza-
tions that all suppose that the grid remains operated by dierent TSOs.
The rst case is what we call an internal market of counter-trading resources. Following up on
current attempts in European circles to get integrated ancillary services like balancing or reserve,
we suppose that an operators can resort to any counter-trading resource in the market whether
in their jurisdictions or outside. We show that we reproduce the result of the full optimization.
This nding also has an interesting mathematical interpretation. It singles out an unusual
27situation where the solution set of a variational inequality problem (in our case the perfectly
coordinated counter-trading problem) coincides with that of the corresponding quasi-variational
inequality problem (when all players have an un-discriminatory access at identical price to all
market shared resources). The economic interpretation is also useful: the un-discriminatory
access to the same set of counter-trading resources \completes the market" and hence makes it
ecient. Last but not least the recourse to the NTF algorithm oers a neat explanation of why
this happens: even though the organization appears to be of the imperfect coordination type, it
may in fact be economically ecient because of the arbitrage taking place in the procurement
of counter-trading resources.
Any restriction to the internal market of counter-trading resources degrades the situation.
A rst degradation happens if operators can only resort in a limited way to counter-trading
resources outside of their jurisdiction. The situation can be improved by creating a market of
transmission services at the counter-trading level, but full eciency will only be restored in very
particular cases. Here again, the resort to the NTF algorithm makes this analysis particularly
easy.
The last case is the one where the market of counter-trading resources is fully segmented.
Eciency is further deteriorated even though the introduction of a common market of trans-
mission resources can again help.
We conduct all the analysis on a simple six nodes region model, but the results are general.
Specically, the recourse to the NTF algorithm only requires solving an optimal power ow
problem. This is now a standard model, which shows that the analysis can be conducted for
any real world problem.
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Appendix A: Market coupling model
When PXs and TSOs are not integrated, PXs clear the energy markets on the basis of a simplied
representation of the transmission grid that TSOs give them. This organization of the energy
market is known as market-coupling (MC). Market coupling is the most advanced version of
cross-border trade implemented in Europe. It is currently applied in France, Belgium and the
Netherlands and soon it will be extended to Germany. According to our problem formulation,
PXs operate in a coordinated way, but they clear a market organized as depicted in Figure
2. The objective function (101) includes the average re-dispatching costs . We here suppose
that the TSO costs are paid through a levy  charged through the PX. This assumption is
introduced for the sake of convenience and does not restrict in any way the scope of the model.
We also assume in this example that it is paid by the generators (the reality is that this levy
is largely charged to the consumer side, but this distinction is immaterial for our purpose) and
then this levy is proportional to the quantity injected in the energy market. Conditions (102)
and (103) express the energy balance in Northern and in the Southern zone respectively. The
free variable I indicates the import/export between the two zones. The shadow variables N;S
are the marginal energy prices of the Northern and Southern zones respectively. Constraints
(104) and (105) impose that ow I respects the transfer limit I of the interconnecting line in
the two possible directions. The dual variables 1 and 2 are the marginal costs of utilization











wj()d +   (q1 + q2 + q4) (101)
s.t.
q1 + q2   q3   I = 0 (N) (102)
q4   q5   q6 + I = 0 (S) (103)
I   I  0 (1) (104)
I + I  0 (2) (105)
qn  0 8n (106)
29Appendix B: Complementarity conditions of the perfectly
coordinated counter-trading model






0  ci(qi + qi)   l 
X
l
PTDFi;l   1 + 2?(qi + qi)  0 i = 1;2;4 (107)
0   !j(q3 + qj) + l 
X
l
PTDF3;l   1   2?(qj + qj)  0 j = 3;5;6 (108)
0  Fl   [
X
i=1;2;4





l  0 (109)
0  Fl + [
X
i=1;2;4



























@qj for j = 3;5;6.
Appendix C: TSOS' s problem in the decentralized counter-
trading Model 1































































j )]  0 (
S; 
l ) (117)
where l = (1   6);(2   5)
qn + qN
n + qS
n  0 n = 1;:::;6 (S
n) (118)
30Appendix D: Complementarity conditions of the imper-
fectly coordinated counter-trading Model 1
We here present the mixed complementarity formulation of the decentralized counter-trading















for l = ((1   6);(2   5)), the complementarity conditions are as follows:






l )PTDFi;l  N;1 +N;2?(qi +qN
i +qS









j )  0 (120)






l )  PTDFi;l   S;1 + S;2?(qi + qN
i + qS
i )  0 (121)








j )  0 (122)












l ]  0 (123)












































i = 0 (S;2) (128)
where i = 1;2;4; j = 3;5;6 and the dual variables N;1, S;1, N;2 and S;2 associated with














































j = 3;5;6 (130)
Note that conditions (119), (120), (125) and (126) exclusively refer to TSON, while (121),
(122), (127) and (128) are those of TSOS. Finally, (123) and (124) are the common transmission
constraints.
31Appendix E: Proof of Proposition 1





is a necessary and sucient condition for a solution x to problem V I(F;K) to be a GNE.
Suppose this property holds for a solution of the parametrized problem (72)-(80). It is
then a GNE and we can write the KKT conditions of that parametrized problem (see the
complementarity conditions in Appendix D). Suppose that qn + qN
n + qS
n > 0 for all n and




l ) in order to simplify the discussion. Then the optimality condition in








































l  PTDFj;l   S;1   S;2 = 0 (135)










l )PTDFj;l = (N;1 + N;2)   (S;1 + S;2) j = 3;5;6 (137)
Because node 6 is the hub, we have PTDF6;l = 0 and hence (N;1+N;2) (S;1+S;2) = 0













(2 5)) j = 3;5 (138)
This is veried only when N
l = S
l because the ratio
PTDFj;(2 5)
PTDFj;(1 6) assumes a positive and a












32Appendix F: Proof of Proposition 2
Assume again in order to simplify the discussion that qn + qN
n + qS











l ) for l = ((1   6);(2   5)). We state the
KKT conditions of the problems of the two TSOs' problems (namely (66)-(71) for TSON and































l PTDFj;l   Z;1   Z;2 = 0 j = 3;5;6 Z = N;S (140)
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i + qS




















=  wj(qj + qN
j + qS
j ) j = 3;5;6 (142)









l (PTDFj;l PTDFi;l) 2Z;1 = 0 Z = N;S
(143)
Since condition (143) holds for both TSOs, we can rewrite it in an explicit way:
ci(qi + qN
i + qS






l (PTDFj;l   PTDFi;l)   2N;1 = 0 (144)
ci(qi + qN
i + qS






l (PTDFj;l   PTDFi;l)   2S;1 = 0 (145)






l )(PTDFj;l   PTDFi;l)   2(N;1   S;1) = 0 (146)









l (PTDFj;l+PTDFi;l)+2Z;2 = 0 Z = N;S
(147)
33that can be substituted by these two conditions:
ci(qi + qN
i + qS






l (PTDFj;l + PTDFi;l) + 2N;2 = 0 (148)
ci(qi + qN
i + qS






l (PTDFj;l + PTDFi;l) + 2S;2 = 0 (149)





l )(PTDFj;l + PTDFi;l)   2(N;2   S;2) = 0 (150)










l )PTDFi;l + (N;1   S;1)   (N;2   S;2) = 0 (152)
By setting,  = (N;1 + N;2)   (S;1 + S;2) and  = (N;1   N;2)   (S;1   S;2) conditions










l )PTDFi;l +  = 0 i = 1;2;4 (154)



















(2 5)) j = 3;5 (157)
But
PTDFj;(2 5)




l . This result means that the marginal value of congestion of one line is identical for
both TSOs. Consequently, the two TSOs are implicitly coordinated and there is no arbitrage.
This also implies that  =  = 0 and then:
(N;1 + N;2)   (S;1 + S;2) = 0 (158)
(N;1   N;2)   (S;1   S;2) = 0 (159)
34These can be rewritten as follows:
N;1   S;1 = (S;2   N;2) (160)
N;1   S;1 =  (S;2   N;2) = 0 (161)
This implies that N;1 = S;1 and N;2 = S;2. 
Appendix G: Proof of Corollary 1






We rst consider the case where  = 0. Under this assumption V I(F;K) = V I(F=0;K) and
the parametrized problem is identical to the optimized counter-trading problem. This can be
easily done by imposing qN
n + qS
n = qn.
As already observed, the optimized counter-trading problem has a unique solution because
of the convexity of the set K and the strict convexity of its objective function. This implies
that the solution of the decentralized counter-trading problem (72)-(80) coincides with that of
the optimized counter-trading model (59)-(65) when  = 0.




l and Z;1 = Z;2
reduces to a unique solution that is the solution of the optimized counter-trading problem (59)-
(65).
Compare now the KKT conditions of the optimized counter-trading problem with those
of the decentralized counter-trading problem. Denote qn = qN
n + qS





l ), the optimality conditions of the optimized counter-trading model are as follows












lPTDFj;l   1   2 = 0 j = 3;5;6 (163)






























l )PTDFj;l   1   2 = 0 j = 3;5;6 (165)
+ transmission constraints and the re-dispatching balances.
Setting l = l+N
l one can easily see that the two groups of optimality conditions are identical
and then the corresponding problems admit the same solution set.
35Appendix H: Complementarity conditions of the decentral-
ized counter-trading Model 2
We here show the mixed complementarity formulation of the un-coordinated counter-trading















for l = ((1 6);(2 5)) and introducing N
n = N;+
n  N; 
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4 )  0 (171)




















j )  0 j = 5;6
(173)
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i = 0 (S;2) (183)
Appendix I: Proof of Proposition 5
Let us denote the NTF's formulation of problem (81)-(91) as to V I(F;K2). The primal
solution of problem V I(F=0;K2) is unique when all 
N=S
l = 0. This is because both the
objective function (81) and the set dened by the constraints are convex. Due to the lack of
perfect arbitrage between the two TSOs, the equality N
l = S
l is no more ensured and then
when 
N=S
l 6= 0 we have two dierent cases.
If 
N=S
l 6= 0 and N
l = S
l , then the transformations applied to l in the complementarity
version of problem (81)-(87) are simply translations (as we already seen in the Proof of Corollary
1 in Appendix G). This means that:

N=S
l = l + 
N=S
l
and implies that under this assumption the solution set of problem V I(F;K2) coincides with
that of problem V I(F=0;K2). Since the solution set of the primal problem of V I(F=0;K2)
contains one solution, this is also the unique solution of V I(F=0;K2).
This does not happens when 
N=S
l 6= 0 and N
l 6= S
l because the translations operated on
the problems of are now dierent. In other words:
N
l = l + N
l (184)
S
l = l + S
l (185)
respectively for the TSON and TSOS. As a consequence, the solution set can admit several
solutions. However, from conditions (184) and (185), one immediately deduces that N











Appendix J: Complementarity conditions of the decentral-
ized counter-trading Model 3
This section presents the complementarity formulation of the imperfectly coordinated counter-















for l = ((1   6);(2   5)), we get the following conditions:





l )  PTDFi;l   N;1 + N;2?(qi + qN
i )  0 i = 1;2 (186)





l )  PTDF3;l   N;1   N;2?(q3 + qN
3 )  0 (187)





l )  PTDF4;l   S;1 + S;2?(q4 + qS
4 )  0 (188)





l )  PTDFj;l   S;1   S;2?(qj + qS
j )  0 j = 5;6 (189)




i ) + PTDF4;l(q4 + qS
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4 = 0 (S;2) (195)
Appendix K: Proof of Proposition 7
The proof is parallel to that of Proposition 5 (see Appendix I).
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